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The Dream of a Northwestern Confederacy

By William C. Cochran



The State Historical Society of Wisconsin
Separate No. 175
From the Proceedings of the Society for 1916

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On the fourth day of February, 1861, "Deputies of the Sovereign and Independent States of South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana," as they styled themselves, met in the state capitol at Montgomery, Alabama, and proceeded to organize a "Provisional Government of the Confederate States of America." The work was all cut and dried, and in four days a complete Constitution was adopted, and on the fifth day Jefferson Davis of Mississippi was elected president, and Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia, vice-president, of the Confederate States of America. There was little travail about the birth of this nation. Its legitimacy was questioned by none present, and it was more than two months before the doubts of the northern portion of the United States found expression in official action. The leaders rejoiced in the fact that there was little debate and no serious opposition to any measure proposed. It is true that the work of constitution making was much facilitated by their having before them the Constitution of the United States, which needed amendment in only a few particulars fully to satisfy the assembled "Deputies."

It is not necessary to describe these amendments particularly, for, on March 11, 1861 a permanent Constitution for the Confederate States of America was adopted

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at Montgomery, which superseded the provisional constitution. This followed the Constitution of the United States so closely that the amendments, like colored patches on a plain garment, were very prominent and disclosed to all the world the real causes for the attempted separation of the slave-holding states from their sister states in the Union.

The preamble recites that:

*“We, the people of the Confederate States, each State acting in its sovereign and independent character * * * do ordain and establish this Constitution * * *.”*

Article I, Section 8, provides:

“ * * no bounties shall be granted from the Treasury; nor shall any duties or taxes on importations from foreign nations be laid to promote or foster any branch of industry * * *.”*

Article I, Section 9, provides that:

*“The importation of negroes of the African race, from any foreign country other than the slaveholding States or Territories of the United States of America, is hereby forbidden * * *.”*

*“Congress shall also have power to prohibit the introduction of slaves from any State not a member of, or Territory not belonging to, this Confederacy. * * *”*

“No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law denying or impairing the right of property in negro slaves shall be passed.”

Article I, Section 10, provides:

*“No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on tonnage, except on sea-going vessels for the improvement of its rivers and harbors navigated by the said vessels * * *.” But when any river divides or flows through two or more States, they may enter into compacts with each other to improve the navigation thereof.”*

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Article IV, Section 2, provides:

“The citizens of each State * * * *shall have the right of transit and sojourn in any State of this Confederacy, with their slaves and other property; and the right of property in said slaves shall not be thereby impaired.*”

Article IV, Section 3, provides:

“*The Confederate States may acquire new territory * * *. In all such territory, the institution of negro slavery, as it now exists in the Confederate States, shall be recognized and protected by Congress, and by the territorial government; and the inhabitants of the several Confederate States and Territories shall have the right to take to such Territory any slaves lawfully held by them in any of the States or Territories of the Confederate States.*”

In brief, the new Constitution differed from the old, chiefly, in two particulars:

1. No manufacturing industry was to be promoted, or sustained, by subsidies or a protective tariff.

2. The institution of negro slavery was to be maintained, unimpaired, throughout all the states and territories of the Confederacy, and extended to any new territory which Congress might acquire.¹

Before their “deputies” were appointed, the several states named had passed ordinances of secession, by which, so far as they had power to do so, they had severed their relations with the United States of America.² The govern-

¹ *Statutes at Large of the Confederate States of America* (Richmond, Va., 1864). The Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Confederate States of America are printed in parallel columns in Jefferson Davis, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government* (New York, 1881), I, app. K, 648-73, and the words found in one and not in the other are italicized so that they can be readily distinguished. The italics in the passages quoted above are Davis’.

² South Carolina, Dec. 20, 1860; Mississippi, Jan. 9, 1861; Florida, Jan. 10, 1861; Alabama, Jan. 11, 1861; Georgia, Jan. 19, 1861; Louisiana, Jan. 26, 1861. Texas adopted an ordinance of secession, Feb. 1, 1861, but its delegates did not arrive in Montgomery in time to take part in the formation of the provisional

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ment which they now proceeded to establish and to which they transferred their allegiance was foreign to that of the United States and its claim of sovereignty over the territory occupied by such states necessarily contradicted that of the United States.

Two of these states, South Carolina and Georgia, might plausibly claim to have been "sovereign and independent states" before the Constitution of the United States was adopted and they gave in their adhesion to the Union. When they came into the Union they brought with them their territory and, if allowed to secede, they would subtract from the territory of the United States only such portion as had been theirs before the Union was formed. The others had no such standing. They were not organized states at all, much less "sovereign and independent states," and they made no contribution to the territory of the United States when they were admitted. They were organized as states of the Union, under and by virtue of the Constitution and laws of the United States, and on territory which had been acquired, by purchase or conquest, by the United States long before their existence as states began.

The United States effected the purchase of the Louisiana Territory, at an expense totaling, with interest and other charges, over \$27,000,000,¹ in order to secure for

government. It was formally admitted as a member of the Confederate States of America, Mar. 3, 1861, and its delegates participated in the formation of the final constitution of the Confederate States of America. The primary authorities for these facts are, of course, the constitutions, ordinances, and statutes of the several states.

¹ The price paid for the Louisiana Territory is commonly stated, in round numbers, as \$15,000,000, but this does not include the sums paid, under the terms of the treaty, to settle the spoliation claims of American citizens against France on account of various seizures and depredations to American commerce since the year 1800. John B. McMaster in his *History of the People of the United States* * * * (New York, 1883-1913), II, 630, has figured the total cost as \$27,-

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the whole West and Northwest free navigation of the Mississippi River and an outlet to the sea. The treaty with France, ceding this territory to the United States, was ratified by the Senate by a vote of twenty-four to seven. Most of the opposition came from the New England and the North Atlantic states, which saw no necessity for such navigation and outlet, so long as they held ports on the Atlantic Ocean. Jefferson received, however, the almost unanimous support of the southern states and of all states west of the Alleghanies. In fact, if the United States had not acquired such territory by purchase, the feeling was so strong among all dwellers in the Mississippi Valley that, sooner or later, armed expeditions would have set out from Kentucky, Tennessee, and the Northern states bordering on the Ohio River and taken forcible possession of the mouth of the Mississippi and all the territory along its banks.¹

267,621. The *Encyclopædia Britannica* adopts these figures as correct; see article "Louisiana Purchase," XVII, 62.

¹ The right of free navigation of the Mississippi River was secured to citizens of the United States by the treaty of 1783 between England and Spain and the United States, but those engaged in river commerce had been subjected to so many annoyances and exactions as to excite a dangerous and growing feeling that the "Dons" must be driven from New Orleans and the banks of the Mississippi at all hazards. The excitement culminated when the Spanish governor at New Orleans withdrew their right to deposit their merchandise and effects in New Orleans pending shipment to foreign ports. Impatient demands were made upon President Jefferson to abate the Spanish nuisance at the mouth of the river. Clubs and militia companies were organized, especially in Kentucky, with the avowed purpose of driving out the Spaniards. The House of Representatives called on the President for information, Dec. 17, 1802, and on December 22 he transmitted the required information, with a statement that he "was led by the regard due to the rights and interest of the United States and to the just sensibility of the portion of our fellow-citizens more immediately affected by the irregular proceeding at New Orleans to lose not a moment in causing every step to be taken which the occasion claimed from me, being equally aware of the obligation to maintain in all cases the rights of the nation * * *." On December 30 he transmitted a long letter from the governor-general of the Province of Louisiana to Governor Claiborne of Mississippi Territory, dated Nov. 15, 1802, which undertakes to give the reasons for suspending the treaty

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Florida and all of Alabama and Mississippi south of 32°28' north latitude were purchased from Spain by the United States for \$5,000,000, partly to settle a boundary dispute between Spain and the state of Georgia and to give Georgia free access to the Gulf of Mexico, but chiefly to rid the continent of the presence and influence of a foreign government which might, at any time, become hostile to the United States.

The United States purchased from Georgia, herself, all claim to territory lying west of her present state

right of deposit and promises some relief. The letter closes delightfully with the expression, "I kiss your Excellency's hands. Your most affectionate servant. * * *"

In a special message to the Senate, Jan. 11, 1803, Jefferson called attention to a new complication. He said: "The cession of the Spanish Province of Louisiana to France, and perhaps of the Floridas, and the late suspension of our right of deposit at New Orleans are events of primary interest to the United States;" and he nominated Robert R. Livingston as minister to France, Charles Pinckney as minister to Spain, and James Monroe to be "Minister extraordinary and plenipotentiary" to both governments, "for the purpose of enlarging and more effectually securing our rights and interests in the river Mississippi and in the Territories eastward thereof."

In his annual message, Oct. 17, 1803, he apologized for calling Congress together at an earlier date than usual on account of "matters of great public concernment," and among other things said: "Congress witnessed at their late session the extraordinary agitation produced in the public mind by the suspension of our right of deposit at the port of New Orleans. * * * They were sensible that the continuance of that privation would be more injurious to our nation than any consequences which could flow from any mode of redress." He submitted for their approval the convention with France for the cession of Louisiana, and summed up its advantages as follows: "Whilst the property and sovereignty of the Mississippi and its waters secure an independent outlet for the produce of the Western States and an uncontrolled navigation through their whole course, free from collision with other powers and the dangers to our peace from that source, the fertility of the country, its climate and extent, promise in due season important aids to our Treasury, an ample provision for our posterity and a wide spread for the blessings of freedom and equal laws." James D. Richardson, *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897* (Washington, 1896-99), I, 346, 348, 350, 358. See also letter from Jefferson to Livingston, April 18, 1802, H. A. Washington (ed.), *Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (Washington, 1854), IV, 431; Albert Phelps, *Louisiana, a Record of Expansion* (Boston, 1905), 155-58.

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boundary, paying her therefor \$1,250,000 and agreeing, as part of the consideration, to extinguish the claims of various Indian tribes to lands in the state of Georgia which was done later at an expense to the United States of over \$4,000,000.¹

The funds used and the power exercised in making these various purchases and in extinguishing adverse titles were *national*. The acquisition of such territory was urged and justified as a measure to promote the *national* welfare and the prosperity of all the States and particularly those of the great central West and Northwest.² The claim that the United States, by providing for the formation of states in such territory and their admission to the Union, deprived itself of sovereignty over such territory except at the pleasure of the states it had created, seemed, to most people at the North, too absurd for argument. What was bought for all and paid for by all should remain a part of the national domain, no matter what form of government was established upon it, or what subdivision into counties and states might be made for the convenient administration of local government.

The resolutions adopted by national parties prior to 1844 related to the character and achievements and executive capacity of candidates, rather than to any principles which might be said to differentiate one party from an-

¹ Article on "Georgia" in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, XI, 756; Horace Greeley, *The American Conflict, A History of the Great Rebellion in the United States of America* * * * (Hartford, 1864), I, 103.

² In his third annual message to Congress, Dec. 4, 1827, Pres. John Quincy Adams said: "The acquisition of them, made at the expense of the whole Union, not only in treasure but in blood, marks a right of property in them equally extensive. By the report and statements from the General Land Office now communicated it appears that under the present Government of the United States a sum little short of \$33,000,000 has been paid from the common Treasury for that portion of this property which has been purchased from France and Spain, and for the extinction of the aboriginal titles." Richardson, *Messages*, II, 391.

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other. A good candidate needed no platform on which to stand. But the Democratic national convention, which met at Baltimore in May, 1844 and nominated James K. Polk, adopted a long series of resolutions, the thirteenth of which was as follows: "13. *Resolved*, That the proceeds of the public lands ought to be sacredly applied to the *national objects* specified in the Constitution, and that we are opposed to the laws lately adopted, and to any law, for the distribution of such proceeds among the states, as alike inexpedient in policy and repugnant to the Constitution."¹

This plank was inserted without material change in the platforms adopted by the Democratic national conventions held at Baltimore in May, 1848,² and in June, 1852,³ and at Cincinnati in June, 1856.⁴ It remained good Democratic doctrine down to the break-up of that party just before the Civil War. The Cincinnati convention, which nominated James Buchanan for president, also "Resolved, That the Democratic party will expect of the next administration [Mr. Buchanan's] that every proper effort will be made to insure our ascendancy in the Gulf of Mexico, and *to maintain a permanent protection to the great outlets through which are emptied into its waters the products raised out of the soil and the commodities created by the industry of the people of our Western valleys and the Union at large.*"⁵

As soon as the ordinances of secession were passed—in many instances before—the several states seized the forts

¹ Thomas Hudson McKee, *National Conventions and Platforms of all Political Parties* * * * (3d ed., Baltimore, 1900), 48–49. The italics are not in the original.

² *Ibid.*, 60.

³ *Ibid.*, 76.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 89.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 93. The italics are not in the original.

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and arsenals within their borders, with the exception of Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor and Fort Pickens and Key West in Florida, and took possession of all the arms and ammunition belonging to the United States, conveniently stored therein by a southern secretary of war. The officers of the United States army in charge of such forts and arsenals were either in full sympathy with the seceding states, or yielded to a mere show of force.¹

South Carolina seceded on December 20, 1860, seized Fort Moultrie, Castle Pinckney, and the United States revenue cutter, William Aiken, on the twenty-seventh, the United States arsenal at Charleston on the thirtieth, and Fort Johnson on the second of January, 1861. The United States steamer, *Star of the West*, conveying supplies to the garrison of Fort Sumter, was fired on by the state artillery at the entrance to the harbor and forced to return without accomplishing its errand, January 9.²

Mississippi seceded on January 9, and on the twelfth planted a battery on the bluff at Vicksburg, thus asserting control over the navigation of the Mississippi River, and a few days later made good the assertion by firing on the steamer, *A. O. Tyler*, from Cincinnati—compelling her to stop and submit to examination by state officials. There were no forts of any importance and no United States arsenals within the state, but the governor of Louisiana, having taken possession of a well-stocked United States arsenal at Baton Rouge on the

¹ An accurate summary of the various steps taken by the seceding states is given under the title of "Preliminary Events," in Robert U. Johnson and C. C. Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* (New York, 1884-87), I.

² Davis, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, I, 213-14, 217-18; Edward A. Pollard, *Southern History of the War: First Year of the War* (New York, 1863), 36; James F. Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850* (New York, 1893-1906), III, 198, 218, 221-22; *Statutes at Large of the Provisional Government of the Confederate States of America* * * * (Richmond, 1864), 163.

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tenth, generously forwarded to the governor of Mississippi 8,000 muskets, 1,000 rifles, six 24-pounder guns, and a quantity of ammunition out of the stores captured by him.¹

Florida did not secede until January 10, 1861, but the state authorities seized the United States arsenal at Apalachicola on the sixth, and Fort Marion at St. Augustine on the seventh. They seized Barrancas Barracks, Fort Barrancas and Fort McRee, and the navy yard at Pensacola, and demanded the surrender of Fort Pickens on the twelfth, and repeated the demand for the surrender on the fifteenth and the eighteenth. Its commander thought, with Major Anderson, that he owed fealty to the government the uniform of which he wore and which had entrusted this fort to his keeping, and it was kept.²

Alabama did not secede until January 11, but the state authorities seized the United States arsenal at Mount Vernon on the fourth, and Forts Morgan and Gaines on Mobile Bay on the fifth.³

Georgia did not secede until January 19, but the state authorities seized Fort Pulaski on the third, and appeared with a force of about 800 militia and some cannon before the United States arsenal at Augusta and demanded its surrender on the twenty-fourth.⁴

¹ Davis, *Rise and fall of the Confederate Government*, I, 220-21 (suppresses the incident of the battery at Vicksburg); Pollard, *First Year of the War*, 37; Rhodes, *History of the United States*, III, 258-59; James W. Garner, *Reconstruction in Mississippi* * * * (New York, 1901), 8-9.

² Davis, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, I, 220; Pollard, *First Year of the War*, 37, 40; Rhodes, *History of the United States*, III, 259, 280-81.

³ Davis, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, I, 220-21; Pollard, *First Year of the War*, 37, 40; Walter L. Fleming, *Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama* (New York, 1905), 37, 47-48.

⁴ Davis, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, I, 220; Pollard, *First Year of the War*, 37, 40; Rhodes, *History of the United States*, III, 272-74; Isaac W. Avery, *History of the State of Georgia from 1850 to 1881* * * * (New York, 1881), 155, 161-64.

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Louisiana did not secede until January 26, but the state authorities seized the United States barracks and arsenal, with large quantities of cannon, small arms, and ammunition, at Baton Rouge on the tenth, Forts Jackson and St. Philip on the Mississippi, and the United States marine hospital below New Orleans on the eleventh, Fort Pike on the fourteenth, and the United States Mint and customhouse, with a large amount of specie, on February 1.¹

This series of aggressive acts, every one of which would have been instantly recognized as an act of war if perpetrated by any foreign power, made peaceable separation an impossibility; though the supineness of the administration and its failure to defend, or to take any steps to recover, any of its property misled the people of the South who still retained Union sentiments. They inferred that the right of secession was conceded, or that, at any rate, the North would not fight to preserve the Union. The unionists, who were undoubtedly in the majority in the states of Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee down to the winter of 1861, were so weakened in their attachment to, and their respect for, the national government that, when forced to choose--as it was adroitly presented--between North and South, by the firing on Sumter and the President's proclamation calling for 75,000 men to suppress insurrection, they sided with their southern brethren.²

¹ Davis, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, I, 220; Pollard, *First Year of the War*, 37, 40; Rhodes, *History of the United States*, III, 272-73, 280, 322; Phelps, *Louisiana*, 305-6; Garner *Reconstruction in Mississippi*, 8-9; *Statutes at Large of the Provisional Government of the Confederate States*, 43-44, 62-63, 94-95, 154; John C. Schwab, *Confederate States of America 1861-1865* * * * (New York, 1904), 6, 9, 43, 85.

² In a carefully written address at Raleigh, N. C., July 4, 1865, S. F. Phillips, a lawyer of great ability, afterwards speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives and solicitor-general of the United States, said: "If there had been a *purpose* to facilitate the formation of a Southern Confederacy, the con-

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Lincoln failed to estimate correctly the gravity of the crisis, the grim determination of the cotton states to effect a final separation, the preparations they had already made for war, and the spontaneous uprising of the North, when thus challenged to fight for the Union or yield to forcible secession.

While there had been, on the part of extreme abolitionists and peace Democrats, some expressions of willingness to let the slave states go in peace,¹ there had been at the North a growing feeling of resentment and wounded national pride during the progress of these events, which did not altogether escape the notice of keen observers in the border states, although its force and intensity were not fully appreciated anywhere, and were not even suspected in the Gulf states.²

duct of the Government must have been very much what it actually was before March, 1861. To many who were loyally disposed it seemed that the United States was admitting its career to be at an end, and that thereafter the continent was * * * to be divided between a North and a South. This presented a new question to North Carolina. The State preferred the Union to any new government whatever, but, as between a North and a South, the most powerful arguments and sympathies impelled her to take part with the latter. Her people observed that the United States (so-called) had allowed force to be applied to strip it of its possessions in many places without resistance. * * * I presume that no doubt is entertained now that this supineness upon the part of the Federal Government, among a thousand evil consequences * * * confirmed the impression sedulously cultivated by its enemies, that the Government was already among the things of the past." Quoted in *Cincinnati Gazette*, July 13, 1865. See also Allen Johnson, *Stephen A. Douglas: A Study in American Politics* (New York, 1908), 441.

¹ New York *Tribune*, Nov. 9 and 26, Dec. 17, 1860, and Feb. 23, 1861; Albany (N. Y.) *Argus*, Nov. 10 and 12, 1860; Ashtabula (Ohio) *Sentinel*, Feb. 6 and 13, 1861; Cincinnati *Commercial*, Jan. 31 (article attributed to Salmon P. Chase) and Feb. 1, 1861; Cincinnati *Enquirer*, Feb. 8, 1861; *Ohio State Journal*, Nov. 13, 17, and 28, 1860, Mar. 27, 1861. Wendell Phillips in a speech at Boston, and William Lloyd Garrison, in an editorial in the *Liberator*, rejoiced in the prospect of the slave states departing and taking their "institution" with them. Thurlow Weed Barnes, *Memoir of Thurlow Weed* (Boston, 1884), II, 305; Davis, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, I, 252-57.

² "All of these events had been accomplished without bloodshed. Abolitionism and Fanaticism had not yet lapped blood. But reflecting men saw that the peace

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When Fort Sumter was bombarded and forced to surrender in order "to fire the Southern heart" and hasten the secession of the border slave states, the match was also touched to the explosive compound of sentiment and wrath at the North. President Lincoln could have secured 300,000 volunteers in the spring of 1861 as easily as 75,000.¹ It was a grave error to limit his call to a number which excited only ridicule at the South where, already, more than 100,000 men had been enrolled, organized, drilled, and fairly well equipped for the field.² Even those men who kept their feelings under the control of reason could see that no lasting peace was possible, even if secession were acquiesced in, so long as such an aggressive, self-willed, military-loving people had anything to gain either by force or intrigue. Acquiescence in their secession and accompanying acts would only embolden them to make further demands.³ The slave states, if allowed to organize as a separate nation, could not suppress the discussion of slavery in the North, could not recover escaped slaves, and could not extend the bounds

was deceitful and temporizing; that the temper of the North was impatient and dark; and that, if all history was not a lie, the first incident of bloodshed would be the prelude to a war of monstrous proportions." Pollard, *First Year of the War*, 40.

¹ In Ohio, volunteers enough to fill twenty-six regiments, in addition to the thirteen called for, offered their services and the governor was authorized by the state legislature to accept them in anticipation of further calls. *Laws of Ohio*, LVIII, 107, 126-27, 132. Other northern states were not far behind.

² Pollard, *First Year of the War*, 48, 59; Schwab, *Confederate States of America*. Robert Toombs, secretary of state of the southern Confederacy, in a letter to Commissioners Yancey, Rost, and Mann, dated Mar. 16, 1861, stated that the Confederate States were then ready to bring 100,000 in to the field. James D. Richardson, *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Confederacy* * * * (Nashville, 1905), II, 6. This number was doubled before September, *ibid.*, 31.

³ The New Orleans *Bee*, March 10, 1861, said: "The Black Republicans are a cowardly set after all. They have not the courage of their own convictions * * *. Appearances indicate their disposition even to forego the exquisite delight of sending armies and fleets to make war on the Confederate States."

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of slavery on the American continent any better than they could while states of the Union, unless they resorted to force. An aristocracy in the South supported by slave labor, fond of martial exercises and display, contemptuous of the supposed craven spirit of the North that would submit to any insult rather than fight, would have been a constant menace to the peace and prosperity of the North. The coolest felt that the time had come to assert the national power and meet force with force.

In the great states of the interior, fear that they would be deprived of all the advantages secured to them by the Louisiana Purchase, as well as national pride, operated to unite the people against the secessionists, and of this apprehension the southern leaders in Congress were fully advised. Leading Democrats, as well as Republicans, from states bordering on the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, sounded the alarm as soon as the intention of the Gulf states to secede became apparent. The thought that the mouths of the Mississippi and the great Gulf ports were again to pass into the hands of a foreign power, and a power which had already shown its disposition to use force for the accomplishment of its purposes, was intolerable to all who had the interests of that section at heart. If the Gulf states could secede and block navigation on the Mississippi and access to their ports, except on such terms as they might prescribe, it followed as a matter of course that the Atlantic states could do likewise and the great interior would be at their mercy.¹

¹ Oliver P. Morton, (Republican), then lieutenant governor-elect of Indiana, soon to be governor and afterwards United States senator, said in a great speech, Nov. 22, 1860: "If South Carolina may secede peaceably, so may New York, Massachusetts, Maryland and Louisiana, cutting off our commerce and destroying our right of way to the ocean. We should thus be shut up in the interior of a continent, surrounded by independent, perhaps hostile nations, through whose territories we could obtain egress to the seaboard only upon

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So far from deterring them, this knowledge of the fears entertained by the people of the Northwest only encouraged the southern leaders to pursue their plans. They had embodied in their constitution a threat which they thought would force the border slave states to join them, by giving Congress the power "to prohibit the introduction of slaves from any State not a member of * * * this Confederacy." They now counted on their ability to force the states, the waters of which were tributary to the Mississippi, either to join the Confederacy, or

such terms as might be agreed to by treaty." William D. Foulke, *Life of Oliver P. Morton, Including His Important Speeches* (Indianapolis, 1899), I, 90.

Senator Doolittle (Republican) of Wisconsin, in a letter to the Republicans of Milwaukee, said: "We have not purchased Florida to protect our entrance into the Gulf of Mexico, nor Louisiana to control the outlet of the Mississippi valley, nor annexed Texas, and defended her against Mexico at the expense of forty thousand lives, and \$100,000,000 *to suffer them now to pass under a foreign and hostile jurisdiction.*" This letter was read and commented on in the U. S. Senate, Dec. 5, 1860, 36 Cong., 2 sess., *Congressional Globe*, pt. 1, 9.

Senator Grimes (Republican) of Iowa wrote to an assembly of the citizens of Burlington, Iowa, which he had been invited to address: "Our position in the centre of the continent, without foreign commerce, dependent upon other States for our markets and for our means for transportation to reach them. would soon, if the right to destroy the Union by secession of the States be conceded, place us in the character of a dependent and conquered province. We need, and must have, at whatever cost, a permanent government and unrestricted access to the Atlantic Ocean and to the Gulf of Mexico. There must be no foreign soil between us and our markets." William Salter, *Life of James W. Grimes* * * * (New York, 1876), 148.

Vallandigham (Democrat) of Ohio, who had not yet wholly adjusted his eyes to southern spectacles, said in the House of Representatives, Dec. 10, 1860: "Sir, we of the Northwest have a deeper interest in the preservation of this Government in its present form, than any other section of the Union. Hemmed in, isolated, cut off from the sea-board upon every side; a thousand miles and more from the mouth of the Mississippi, *the free navigation of which* under the law of nations, *we demand, and will have at every cost;* with nothing else but our other great inland seas, the lakes—and their outlet, too, through a foreign country—what is to be our destiny? * * * Where is to be our outlet? * * * We are seven States now, with fourteen Senators and fifty-one Representatives, and a population of nine millions. * * * We do not mean to be a dependency or province either of the East or of the South; * * * and if we cannot secure a maritime boundary upon other terms, we will cleave our way to the seacoast with the sword." 36 Cong., 2 sess., *Cong. Globe*, pt. 1, 38.

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to break away from New England and the Atlantic states and form a northwestern confederacy, which would, for its own interest, ally itself by treaty with the southern Confederacy. Some used threats, others made promises—all calculated to induce the Northwest to acquiesce in secession and ultimately to join the southern Confederacy.¹

McClermand (Democrat) of Illinois, afterwards major general of United States volunteers, said on the same day: "Peaceable secession, in my judgment, is a fatal, a deadly illusion. * * * "

"What, too, would be the fate of the youthful but giant Northwest, in the event of a separation of the slaveholding from the non-slaveholding States? Cut off from the main Mississippi and the Gulf of Mexico on one hand, or from the eastern Atlantic ports on the other, she would gradually sink into a pastoral State, and to a standard of national inferiority. This the hardy and adventurous millions of the Northwest would be unwilling to consent to. * * * No power on earth could restrain them from freely and unconditionally communicating with the Gulf and the great mart of New York." *Ibid.*, 39.

Senator Andrew Johnson (Democrat) of Tennessee, afterwards president of the United States, said, Dec. 19, 1860; "Again: take the case of Louisiana. What did we pay for her in 1803, and for what was she wanted? * * * Was it not to secure the free navigation of the Mississippi river, the mouth of which was then in possession of France, shortly before, of Spain * * * Simply for Louisiana? No, but for all the States. * * * And now, after all this; after the money has been paid, after the free navigation of the river has been obtained * * * Louisiana says to the other States, 'We will go out of this Confederacy * * * if we think proper, and constitute ourselves an independent Power, and bid defiance to the other States.' It is an absurdity * * * " *Ibid.*, 137.

Senator Douglas of Illinois, the Democrat who had received a larger vote for president than all others opposed to Lincoln and who might therefore be considered the representative of northern Democracy, wrote to his friend, C. H. Lanphier, Dec. 25, 1860: "The prospects are gloomy, but I do not yet despair of the Union. *We can never acknowledge the right of a State to secede and cut us off from the Ocean and the world, without our consent.*" Johnson, *Stephen A. Douglas*, 447.

Governor Magoffin (Democrat) of Kentucky, in an address to the people of Kentucky after the election of Lincoln, said: "To South Carolina and such other States as may wish to secede from the Union, I would say: 'The geography of this country will not admit of a division; the mouth and sources of the Mississippi river cannot be separated without the horrors of civil war. We cannot sustain you in this movement merely on account of the election of Lincoln.' " Greeley, *American Conflict*, I, 340-41.

¹ Senator Wigfall (Democrat) of Texas said, Dec. 12, 1860: "Ohio and Indiana and Illinois may see that the grain, and the meat, and the hemp, and the horses, and the mules, which they now furnish to us, may be bought in Kentucky and

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As confidently expected by the Gulf states, all the slave states united with the Confederacy when the issue was joined, except Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, and Missouri. They fully expected Missouri and Kentucky to join, also, but sentiment was so divided in these states that nothing but internecine warfare resulted until the United States occupied both states in force.

in Missouri and in Tennessee; and they may leave you [addressing the New England Senators] in the cold and come to us." 36 Cong., 2 sess., *Cong. Globe*, pt. 1, 74.

We have noticed (see *ante*, 221) the act of Mississippi in firing on a steamer navigating the Mississippi and compelling it to stop and be searched by an officer of the state. A few days later Louisiana adopted a resolution recognizing "the right of the free navigation of the Mississippi River and its tributaries by all friendly States bordering thereon," and also "the right of egress and ingress of the mouths of the Mississippi by all *friendly States* and powers." John G. Nicolay and John Hay, *Abraham Lincoln* (New York, 1890), III, 192-93. If the northwestern states adhered to the South there would be no interruption of trade; if they adhered to the Union they could not be classed as "friendly." The Provisional Congress of the Confederate States provided, by act approved Feb. 25, 1861, that the free navigation of the Mississippi River should be extended "to the citizens of the States upon its borders or upon the borders of its navigable tributaries." *Statutes at Large*, chap. xiv, 36-38. This might be construed as referring only to states coming under the Constitution of the Confederate States.

Senator Slidell of Louisiana said in answer to Senator Johnson's remarks (*ante*, 228) that they proposed to extend the free navigation of the Mississippi to every citizen of the Northwest. Johnson replied, "That may all be very true * * * It is a power that I am not willing to concede to be exercised at the discretion of any authority outside of this Government." 36 Cong., 2 sess., *Cong. Globe*, pt. I, 137.

Alexander H. Stephens, the newly elected vice-president of the Confederate States, said in a speech at Savannah, Ga., Mar. 21, 1861: "Looking to the distant future,—and perhaps not very distant either—it is not beyond the range of possibility, and even probability, that all the great States of the Northwest shall gravitate this way, as well as Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, Arkansas, etc." Henry Wilson, *Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America* (Boston, 1872-84), III, 125.

Just four years later, Lewis Hanes of North Carolina said in a bold speech at Newbern, N. C.: "The only hope I have ever seen of success in this struggle was that the Northwestern States might be induced to join our Confederacy. The manner in which those States voted in the late Presidential election has dispelled that hope forever, and, in my judgment, has sealed the fate of the Confederacy." *Cincinnati Daily Gazette*, Feb. 23, 1865.

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There were substantial grounds for hoping that the Northwest, also, would join the Confederacy. The principal trade of all these states had been with the South. As indicated in the discussions preceding secession, the Mississippi Valley was the natural outlet for the live stock, produce, and manufactures of the states west of the Alleghanies. Large fleets of steamboats were employed in carrying such products from the valleys of the Ohio, Missouri, and upper Mississippi to western Tennessee, Arkansas, Mississippi, Louisiana, and such parts of Texas as were watered by the Red River and its tributaries. They returned laden with cotton, sugar, molasses, and tropical fruits, which were distributed throughout the Northwest. When Cincinnati was deprived of its southern trade by the war and the reconstruction troubles it almost ceased to grow. Every year before the war, thousands of flatboats were rudely constructed, filled with bacon, flour, cornmeal, potatoes, apples, dried fruits, and other products, which were peddled out on the lower Mississippi, and the boats themselves were sold for lumber. Why should the Northwest sacrifice this lucrative trade?

With the exception of eastern Ohio, the Northwest was chiefly an agricultural country and the natural inclination of the people was toward free trade, modified only by the necessity for a national revenue. The high tariff, it was argued, benefited only New England, and the Northwest must, in its own interest, emancipate itself from the domination of eastern manufacturers and importers and ally itself with the southern states, with which it had always enjoyed close business relations. There might be a "foolish prejudice" against slavery on the part of some people in northern Ohio, northern Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota, but there was little or

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no such sentiment in the territory bordering on the Ohio River and Missouri. What little there was might be expected to disappear in the face of the material advantages of a southern alliance.

The United States census of 1860 showed that 274,146* of the people of Missouri, 179,426 of the people of Illinois, 161,213 of the people of Indiana, 134,210 of the people of Ohio, and 54,781 of the people of Iowa, were born in slave states.¹ The percentage of such persons living in the above-named states varied from 5.74 per cent in Ohio to 24 per cent in Missouri. The men of southern birth were among the earliest settlers of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. They dominated the Democratic party and, through it, practically controlled those states until the formation of the Republican party. Their sympathies were naturally with the South. Some of them took their slaves with them into Indiana and Illinois, and the rest, if not actually proslavery, saw no particular harm in the "institution."²

¹ The infusion of southern blood in other states of the Northwest was a negligible quantity. The following table shows the derivation of the persons born in slave states and residing in the above-named states.

State	Del.	Md.	Va.	Ky.	N. C.	Tenn.	All others
Illinois.....	1,888	10,476	32,978	60,193	13,597	39,012	21,282
Indiana.....	2,301	9,673	36,848	68,588	26,942	10,356	6,505
Iowa.....	850	4,663	17,994	13,204	4,690	5,773	7,607
Missouri.....	747	6,015	53,957	99,814	20,259	73,594	*19,760
Ohio.....	3,045	28,680	75,874	15,074	4,701	2,006	4,830
Total.....	8,831	59,507	217,651	256,873	70,189	130,741	59,984

* This does not include children born in Missouri; but such children, living in the other states named, are included under the head of "All others."

² "The feelings of the people of Indiana were not unfriendly to the South nor to her 'peculiar institution.' The State was considered one of the 'outlying provinces of the empire of slavery.'" Foulke, *Life of Morton*, I, 35.

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From 1789 to 1807 there had been a continuous struggle on the part of the Legislative Council and House of Representatives of Indiana Territory--then comprising all of the Northwest Territory except the state of Ohio--to secure a suspension of the sixth article of the Ordinance of 1787, so as to permit the introduction of slaves into the Territory. In December, 1805 a petition was presented to Congress praying for such suspension, and February 14, 1806 the committee to which the petition was referred reported favorably, saying: "The suspension of this Article is an object almost universally desired in that Territory." No final action having been taken on the subject before the adjournment of Congress, on January 20, 1807 the speaker laid before the House of Representatives a letter from William Henry Harrison, governor of the Territory and afterwards president of the United States, transmitting certain resolutions which he said had been *unanimously adopted* by the Territorial Council and House of Representatives in favor of sus-

"The Illinois Senators had voted for the admission of Missouri as a slave State. * * * Many people who had land and farms to sell, looked upon the good fortune of Missouri with envy; whilst the lordly immigrant, as he passed along with his money and droves of negroes, took a malicious pleasure in increasing it by pretending to regret the short-sighted policy of Illinois, which exclude him from settlement, and from purchasing and holding lands. In this mode a desire to make Illinois a Slave State became quite prevalent." Shelby M. Cullom, *Fifty Years of Public Service* * * * (Chicago, 1911), 17. It was not until 1823 that "the question of making Illinois permanently a Slave State was put to rest by a majority of about two thousand votes. The census of 1850 was the first that enumerated no slaves in our State." *Ibid.*, 19.

"When Illinois was admitted to the Union in 1818, all the organized counties lay to the south of the projected national road between Terre Haute and Alton, hence well within the sphere of surrounding Southern influences. The society of Illinois was at this time predominantly Southern in its origin and characteristics. * * * The movement to make Illinois a slave State was motivated by the desire to accelerate immigration from the South." Johnson, *Stephen A. Douglas*, 152-53. "When Illinois was admitted as a State, there were over seven hundred negroes held in servitude. In spite of the Ordinance of 1787, Illinois was practically a slave Territory." *Ibid.*, 155.

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pending the obnoxious sixth article. A committee again reported favorably on the resolutions and its report was sustained in the House, but failed in the Senate, and there the matter seems to have dropped, so far as Congressional action was concerned.¹

There was, of course, considerable intercourse and communication between these settlers from the South and their relatives and old neighbors in Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, and Tennessee, and the mass of the people in those states might be pardoned for believing that the border states of the North would not be disinclined to unite their fortunes with the South.

As in most matters of diplomacy and intrigue—especially those which fail of success—the public was not informed of what was going on in secret, and it is only by piecing together bits of information gathered here and there that we can trace the movements for the establishment of a northwestern confederacy, which should, at least, be in full sympathy with the South.

Among the various plans proposed for saving the Union during the winter of 1860–61, attention should be called to that of C. L. Vallandigham, who had shown in his speech of December 10, 1860 that he appreciated the importance to the Northwest of the free navigation of the Mississippi.²

On February 7, 1861 he proposed amendments to the Constitution of the United States, with several *whereases*, the last two of which read as follows:

And *whereas* it concerns the peace and stability of the Federal Union and Government that a division of the States into mere slave-holding

¹ Davis, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, I, 8–10; McMaster, *History of the United States*, III, 521–28. One of the interesting facts which McMaster brings out is that just after the Louisiana Purchase the people of Illinois petitioned Congress to be set off from the Indiana Territory and attached to Louisiana. *Ibid.*, 526.

² *Ante*, 227, note.

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and non-slaveholding sections, causing hitherto, and from the nature and necessity of the case, inflammatory and disastrous controversies upon the subject of slavery * * * should be forever hereafter ignored; and *whereas*, this important end is best to be attained by the recognition of other sections without regard to slavery, neither of which sections shall alone be strong enough to oppress or control the others, and each be vested with the power to protect itself from aggressions. Therefore: * * *

The United States should be divided into *four* sections instead of *two*; the first to consist of the New England states, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania; the second to consist of the northwestern states and any new states formed out of territory now held or hereafter acquired north of latitude 36° 30' east of the crest of the Rocky Mountains; the third to consist of California, Oregon, and all new states formed out of territory west of the Rocky Mountains and the Rio Grande; and the fourth--by far the largest and strongest of all, as matters then stood--to consist of all the slave states, and all new states which might be formed out of territory south of latitude 36° 30' and east of the Rio Grande.

No act could be passed except by the concurrence of all four sections; any one section could, therefore, defeat legislation desired by all of the other three. No president or vice-president could be elected except by the concurrence of a majority of all the electors of each section; a mere majority of the electors in any one section could, therefore, defeat the election of a president desired by all the rest; and, if the election of a president was thrown into the Senate by reason of the opposition of a little more than one-half of one-fourth of all the electors, the senators were to vote by sections and a majority of the senators of any one section could defeat the choice of a president desired by all the others.¹

¹ 36 Cong., 2 sess., *Cong. Globe*, pt. 1, 794-95.

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The ship of state was to be kept afloat by dividing the hull into four separate compartments, removing sails and machinery, and preventing any one from taking command. A more effectual scheme for blocking legislation and elections could hardly be devised.

On February 20, 1861 Vallandigham addressed the House at length, elucidating and advocating his scheme, and trying to give it a philosophical gloss. Majorities were inclined to be despotic and to disregard the rights of minorities; *ergo*, they must be subjected to the will of the minority. It was dangerous to entrust any man with the disbursement of \$80,000,000 a year and the appointment of hundreds of officials; *ergo*, one-eighth of the people could prevent any man's having such power. Quoting from a letter of Thomas Jefferson to a Mr. Holmes, in 1820, "A geographical line coinciding with a marked principle, moral and political, once conceived and held up to the angry passions of men, will never be obliterated, and every new irritation will mark it deeper and deeper," and stating that "it is this very coincidence of geographical line with the marked principle, moral and political, of slavery, which I propose to reach and to obliterate in the only way possible; by running other lines, coinciding with other and less dangerous principles, none of them moral." Vallandigham proposed to bound one of the sections by the line between the free and the slave states, adding some unorganized territory to the latter, and then to divide the free states into three sections.¹ If he had

¹ *Ibid.*, app., 235-43. On Jan. 11, 1860 the Democratic State Convention of Alabama resolved, among other things, that "all issues and principles" were "inferior in dignity and importance to the great question of slavery." Pollard, *First Year of the War*, 29-30. So a division of the slave states on any other principle was manifestly out of the question. The political "solidity" of the South has not been broken from that day to this, except in superficial appearance during the Reconstruction period.

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intended to make the slave states all powerful and to dissipate the strength of the free states by division, he could not have devised a better scheme.

“Sunset” Cox has vouched for the patriotism and sincerity of Vallandigham¹ but Vallandigham had resided and taught school in Maryland and married a daughter of a Maryland planter. He saw slavery at its best and, like Douglas, felt that the agitation against it was fanatical, unreasonable, and destructive. He was a very intense man and had exceptional ability as a public speaker. His vocabulary of vituperation was extensive. But he must have been strangely lacking in a sense of humor and very narrow-minded if he sincerely believed the constitutional *establishment* of the line between the slave states and the free would *obliterate* it.

This idea of making a separate section of the Northwest and of ultimately allying it with the southern states took deep root in Vallandigham’s mind and thereafter became one of the governing principles of his political life, leading him on to actions and combinations which bordered on treason.²

After the fall of Sumter and the call for volunteers, to which the northwestern states responded enthusiastically, enrolling double their respective quotas under the call, very little was heard for a time of an alliance between

¹ Samuel Sullivan, *Three Decades of Federal Legislation* (1886), 80–81.

² Jacob D. Cox, *Military Reminiscences of the Civil War* (New York, 1900), I, 459; Emilius O. Randall and Daniel J. Ryan, *History of Ohio* * * * (New York, 1912–15), IV, 209–10.

After the secession of Georgia, Jan. 22, 1861, Ranse Wright, commissioner from that state to Maryland, found Governor Hicks of that state uncompromisingly opposed to secession, and, if a disruption were made, he favored a central confederacy, including New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, Missouri, and Ohio, and was then in correspondence with the governor of those states upon the subject. Isaac W. Avery, *History of the State of Georgia* * * * (New York, 1881), 165.

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the South and the Northwest. The Confederates seized and fortified strong positions on the banks of the Mississippi, in Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Louisiana, and closed the river to navigation from Cairo to the forts below New Orleans. Little mention was made of an alliance with the Northwest in the newspapers, or in the public proceedings of legislative bodies, thereafter, for more than a year; but many persons both in the North and the South had an idea that such a union or alliance might be possible and it found expression in private conversation and correspondence.

Gen. J. D. Cox, the Union commander in West Virginia during a large part of the years 1861-62, wrote as follows to Aaron F. Perry of Cincinnati under date of December 18, 1862:

In arguing the general question of disunion we have been so in the habit of talking of the possession of the whole length of the Mississippi as indispensable to the Western States that there is danger of that very argument being used against us, if we should suddenly find disunion a *fait accompli*. Then, as if in anticipation of something of the sort, the Confederates have constantly made a show of different feeling toward the West from that which they have manifested toward the East. They have professed to have less bitterness, greater appreciation of our bravery, greater willingness to be reconciled to us, &c. The extent to which this has been carried can hardly be believed by one who has not been meeting them in the field.¹

All correspondence passing through the lines between West Virginia families and their relatives in the southern armies was necessarily scanned pretty closely, and the General had frequent opportunities to discuss matters with prisoners and their families. Boxes and trunks full of letters were captured or brought out of their hiding places, among them the letters, diaries, and other papers

¹ Political Correspondence of Maj. General J. D. Cox. Manuscript.

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of General Floyd, and Gen. Alfred Beckley.¹ One of the most interesting of these prisoners was Clifton W. Tayleure, formerly an editor of the Baltimore *American* and, when captured, a correspondent of the Richmond *Enquirer*, who might have been shot for a spy if he had fallen into other hands than those of Colonel (afterwards President) Hayes and General Cox. They were much interested in what he had to say, and finding him a gentleman and anxious to reach and remain with his family in Baltimore, General Cox allowed him to go there under parole.²

On January 8, 1862 Thomas A. Hendricks, afterwards senator from Indiana, governor of Indiana, and Democratic candidate for vice-president in 1876, made a speech, upon taking the chair at a Democratic state convention, in which he revealed an undercurrent of thought then prevailing in his party and especially that portion of it which peopled the southern counties. He said, among other things:

We are now being so crushed that if we and our children are not to become the hewers of wood and drawers of water for the capitalists of New England and Pennsylvania, we must look to the interests of our section * * * To encourage and stimulate the people of the South in the production of their peculiar commodities, that they may be large buyers from us, has been, and so long as "grass grows and water runs," will be, the true interest of the Northwest. * * *

The first and highest interest of the Northwest is in the restoration and preservation of the Union * * * *but if the failure and folly and wickedness of the party in power render a Union impossible, then the mighty Northwest must take care of herself and her own interests.* She must not allow the arts and finesse of New England to despoil her of her richest commerce and trade * * * .³

¹ Cox, *Military Reminiscences*, I, 153-64; Charles R. Williams, *Life of Rutherford Birchard Hayes* (Boston, 1914), I, 138, 148-51, 154, 159, 161, 163.

² *Ibid.*, 166-67.

³ Foulke, *Life of Morton*, I 175-76. This is a well-written, accurate, and very informing biography.

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This "keynote" was almost silenced for a time by the Union victories at Mill Springs, Kentucky, on January 20, at Fort Henry on February 6, and at Fort Donelson on February 16. But on the very day that Fort Donelson surrendered the Richmond *Enquirer* published a telegraphic dispatch from Mobile, the nature of which is sufficiently indicated by the heading, "Grand Programme For Forming a Northwestern Confederacy."

There is abundant evidence, some of which has been referred to, that peace advocates and southern sympathizers residing in the North were in correspondence with friends in the South during the years 1862-64, and that the forming of a Northwestern confederacy constituted the staple of many letters.¹ The speeches of Vallandigham of Ohio, Hendricks and Voorhees of Indiana, Richardson of Illinois, and other northern Democrats, advocating a suspension of hostilities and a reunion between the southwestern and the northwestern states, met with a ready response in the shape of communications to southern newspapers and favoring editorials in some of them.

The northward drive of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston,

¹ In the correspondence of Isham G. Harris, Confederate, Governor of Tennessee, were found letters from John D. Riley, dated Belleville, Ala., March 12, 1862, and F. W. Pickens, dated Murfreesboro, Tenn., July 24, 1862, urging Harris to arrange a meeting with the Governors of the Northwestern States at Memphis, to consult as to terms of peace, or to negotiate a separate treaty with any of them who might feel so disposed. Pickens said, among other things: "If the subject were properly opened, we might discover a desire in these States to erect themselves into a separate government, or at least to agree upon terms of peace as far as they are concerned. Such a meeting of Governors would give them an opportunity to act independent of the despotic and fanatical government at Washington. * * * Nothing that we might do must ever be construed as a sanction to any policy calculated to adopt or admit any non-slaveholding State as part of the Confederacy." Harris replied: "While I concur with you in intent and should rejoice in the accomplishment of the object, yet I am persuaded * * * it is safer and better to leave this matter in the hands of the common government of us all." Letters reprinted in *Cincinnati Commercial*, Sept. 1, 1865.

resulting in the bloody battle of Shiloh, April 6 and 7, 1862, had for its immediate object the recovery of the states of Tennessee and Kentucky and, this being accomplished, the invasion of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, the overthrow of the loyal governments there, and the establishment of new governments in sympathy with the South.¹

General Bragg invaded Kentucky in the summer of 1862, threatened Cincinnati and Louisville, inaugurated a Confederate governor at Frankfort, and after several minor engagements fought the battle of Perryville, October 8, 1862. In this battle he inflicted severe losses on some raw recruits in the northern army and then, despairing of any substantial victory over Buell's veteran army which confronted him, made good his retreat. He carried with him into Kentucky 20,000 stand of arms for the recruits he had been led to expect there and those he might find with their aid, on crossing the Ohio. But his "ringing proclamation," offering Kentuckians an "opportunity to free themselves from the tyranny of a despotic ruler," brought no response. On October 12 he reported that not only was there no demand for these extra weapons, but that fully one-half the arms left in his hands, by reason of casualties in his command, remained unused.²

The military results of Bragg's movement were small; but one object had been to affect the fall elections in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, and it did so to some extent, for all of these states returned Democratic majorities.

¹ Davis, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, II, 61. After deploring the untimely death of Johnston, he says: "With a skillful commander, like Johnston, to lead our troops, the enemy would have sought safety on the north bank of the Ohio; * * * Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri would have been recovered, the Northwest disaffected, and our armies filled with the men of the Southwest, *and perhaps of the Northwest also.*" The italics are not in the original.

² *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, ser. 1, XVI, pt. 1, 1088 and pt. 2, 771, 822.

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Of course, McClellan's disasters in the Peninsular Campaign and Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation contributed to this result. The Unionists were profoundly discouraged. Governor Morton was furious at Bragg's success—in electioneering—and his subsequent escape, and demanded the removal of General Buell, which soon followed.¹

On January 1, 1863 the Democracy of Brown County, Indiana, resolved that if the rebellion should be consummated by the recognition of the southern Confederacy, their interests and inclinations would demand a withdrawal from political associations with New England.²

¹ Foulke, *Life of Morton*, I, 197–98. On Oct. 27, 1862 Morton wrote to President Lincoln: "The fate of the North is trembling in the balance. The result of the late elections admonishes all who understand its import that not an hour is to be lost. The Democratic politicians of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois assume that the rebellion will not be crushed, and that the independence of the rebel Confederacy will, before many months, be practically acknowledged." *Ibid.*, 208. "They ask the question, 'what shall be the destiny of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois? Shall they remain attached to the old government, or shall they secede and form a new one,—a Northwestern Confederacy—as a preparatory step to annexation with the South?' The latter project is the programme, and has been for the last twelve months. During the recent campaign it was the staple of every Democratic speech—that we had no interests or sympathies in common with the people of the Northern and Eastern states; that New England is fattening at our expense * * * that geographically these states are a part of the Mississippi Valley, and, in their political associations and destiny, can not be separated from the other States of that valley; * * * that the people of the Northwest can never consent to be separated politically from the people who control the mouth of that river.

* * * * *

The South would have the prestige of success; the commerce of the world would be opened to feed and furnish her armies, and she would contend for every foot of land west of the Alleghenies, and in the struggle would be supported by a powerful party in these States. * * * The plan which I have to suggest is the complete clearing out of all obstacles to the navigation of the Mississippi river and the thorough conquest of the states upon its western bank * * * the creation of a guaranty against the further depreciation of the loyalty of the Northwestern states by the assurance that whatever may be the result of the war, the free navigation and control of the Mississippi river will be secured at all events." *Ibid.*, 209–11.

² *Ibid.*, 213.

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Similar resolutions, so like each other as to suggest a common origin, were passed by at least fifteen other counties of Indiana in January, February, and March, 1863.¹ On the third of January, 1863 Morton telegraphed Secretary Stanton that he was advised that a joint resolution would be passed by the legislature acknowledging the Confederacy and urging the Northwest to dissolve all relations with New England; and the Republican senators, believing that some such resolutions would be offered, broke the quorum by absenting themselves.²

Emboldened by the Democratic success at the fall election, although he himself had failed of reëlection, Vallandigham made an impassioned speech in the House on January 14, 1863, said to have been "the greatest speech of his whole life of opposition" and to have been "extensively circulated both in this country and Europe." In it he said: "You can never subdue the seceded States. Two years of fearful experience have taught you that. Why carry on this war? If you persist, it can only end in final separation between the North and the South. And, in that case, believe it now, as you did not my former warnings, *the whole Northwest will go with the South.*"³

After his term expired, he traveled about the state of Ohio, making bitter and vindictive speeches against the administration, advising people not to pay their taxes, and inciting men to resist the draft and the arrest of deserters, by force of arms if necessary. His exhortations were followed by organized and armed resistance to the provost marshals in Noble and Holmes counties. Two companies of the 115th Ohio, with ten days' rations and forty rounds of ammunition, were required to suppress the

¹ *Ibid.*, 382-83.

² *Ibid.*, 213-14.

³ Randall and Ryan, *History of Ohio*, IV, 209-10.

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uprising in Noble County, and in Holmes County the rioters, 1,000 strong with four howitzers in a fortified camp, resisted a veteran regiment until it was almost on them and several had been seriously wounded.¹

On April 13, 1863, General Burnside, then commander of the Department of the Ohio, issued General Order No. 38, warning all persons against treasonable practices, and particularly against "Acts for the benefit of the enemies of our country," and adding: "The habit of declaring sympathy for the enemy will not be allowed in this department. Persons committing such offenses will be at once arrested, with a view to being tried as above stated, or *sent beyond our lines into the lines of their friends*."²

On May 1, at Mt. Vernon, Ohio, Vallandigham denounced Order No. 38, defied the authorities to attempt to execute it, and advised forcible resistance to the draft. He was arrested at Dayton on May 5, tried before a military commission at Cincinnati, convicted, and sentenced to close confinement in Fort Warren, Boston Harbor, "there to be kept during the continuance of the war." Yielding to a general protest against the arrest and trial of civilians by a military commission in a loyal state where the courts were open and the course of justice unobstructed, Lincoln commuted the sentence to banishment beyond our military lines, and on May 25, Vallandigham was conveyed within the picket lines of Bragg's army and left there.³

The Unionists were generally appeased by this humorous way of making the "punishment fit the crime"

¹ *Ibid.*, 215-27; Cox, *Military Reminiscences*, I, 245-50; Nicolay and Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, VII, 328-54.

² *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, ser. 1, XXIII, pt. 2, 237.

³ Cox, *Military Reminiscences*, I 458-63; Randall and Ryan, *History of Ohio*, IV, 215-27; James F. Rhodes, *History of the United States* * * * (New York, 1893-1906), IV, 245-50; Nicolay and Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, VII, 328-54.

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which, it appears from Order No. 38, was not original with Lincoln, and forgot or forgave the irregular mode of prosecution. Its chief interest in connection with this paper consists in the glimpse which it affords us of what was still in the minds of many southern leaders, and in the new direction which it gave to Vollandigham's activities. General Beauregard wrote to a friend in Mobile, May 26, 1863 that "Lee [should] act on the defensive, and send to Bragg 30,000 men for him to take the offensive with at once; let him (or whoever is put in his place) destroy or capture (as it is done in Europe) Rosecrans' army; then march into Kentucky, raise 30,000 men more there and in Tennessee; then get into Ohio, and call upon the friends of Vollandigham to rise for his defense and support; then call upon Indiana, Illinois and Missouri to throw off the yoke of the accursed Yankee nation; then upon the whole Northwest to join in the movement, *form a Confederacy of their own, and join us by a treaty of alliance, defensive and offensive.* What would then become of the Northeast? How long would it take us to bring it back to its senses?"¹

Vollandigham was courteously treated by the Confederate authorities, had a conference with the leading men, the purport of which was not made public at the time,² and then was assisted in running the blockade and making his way to Canada by way of Bermuda and Halifax. His nomination on June 11 as the Democratic candidate for governor of Ohio gave him additional prestige, and the issue to be fought out in Ohio during the summer and fall of 1863 was of vital importance to the

¹ *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, ser. 1, XIV, 955.

² John Jones, *Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital* (Philadelphia, 1866), I, 357 says that he "saw the memorandum of Mr. Ould, of the conversation held with Mr. Vollandigham, for file in the archives. He says if we *can only hold out this year* that the peace party of the North would sweep the Lincoln dynasty out of political existence."

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southern Confederacy. As a conspicuous "victim of military despotism," Vallandigham made an ideal candidate for opponents of the administration; but every one at all familiar with his record knew that his election meant not only full consent to the secession of the southern states, but also immediate and persistent efforts to detach the Northwest from the Union and ally it with the South. The United States was to become but a memory; and the great Northwest was to prefer an alliance with a slave power to one with the merchants and manufacturers, the wealth and the culture, of the East. It was not a pleasant outlook for those who loved their country. The election was hotly—one might truthfully say fiercely—contested; the ablest speakers on both sides took part in the campaign; the vote was the largest ever polled in Ohio up to that time, and the result most decisive. The fall of Vicksburg and the defeat of Lee, "the invincible," at Gettysburg on July 4, contributed greatly to restore confidence in the ultimate success of the Union, and the cavalry raid of John Morgan through southern Ohio brought home to all the danger of allowing so warlike and aggressive a people to establish itself as an independent nation just across the Ohio. Vallandigham received but 187,728 votes out of a total of 476,554.¹

Ohio could not be carried out of the Union by consent of the voters. The crisis was past. The common saying, "As goes Ohio, so goes the Union," received fresh confirmation. But the efforts to array the Northwestern states against the East and take them out of the Union did not end with this election.

Early in 1863, as a result of independent investigations, Governor Morton in Indiana, Governor Yates in Illinois,

¹ This campaign has been treated so fully in all histories of the period that I need not cite any authorities for my brief statement.

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and Governor Kirkwood and Senator Grimes in Iowa discovered that secret societies were organized in the several states and in Kentucky and Missouri, having for their main objects opposition to the war and aid to the Confederates. Their origin is traced to "The American Knights," a southern order of which General Beauregard and other southern officers were conspicuous leaders. The northern "lodges" or "temples" at first bore the same name, but were afterwards known as "Knights of the Golden Circle," "The Order of the Star," "Sons of '76," or "Sons of Liberty." They changed their names to suit the exigencies of the time, much as fugitives from justice assume an *alias*. They discouraged enlistments and encouraged desertion; they protected deserters and obstructed provost marshals in the performance of their duties; they resisted the draft and they conspired to overthrow the state governments; they sent information to the southern armies and smuggled medicines, supplies, arms, and ammunition through the lines. They formed military companies which drilled stealthily and provided themselves with horses, guns, and pistols.¹

Governor Yates wrote, on April 3, 1863, that they were getting ready for resistance to the government and that it would be unsafe to begin the draft without troops to maintain order. There was a draft riot at Danville, Illinois, in August, 1863.² Senator Grimes wrote, April 20, 1863, "they are organized for insurrection and nothing else."³ Governor Morton, with the aid of General Carrington, kept close watch on their movements in Indiana. Commenting on his activity, the Indianapolis *Sentinel* declared in February, 1863 that there was no hope of

¹ Rhodes, *History of the United States*, V, 317-19.

² *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, ser. 3, III, 116, 722, 1005, 1008, 1047.

³ *Ibid.*, 124.

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ultimate success. "When Republicans organized to resist the formation of a Northwestern Confederacy it was evident that there was danger of another revolution more alarming even than the rebellion."¹

On May 23, 1863 a Democratic mass meeting was held in Indianapolis to which 10,000 or 12,000 persons came, of whom "no less than three thousand were armed." Prompt steps were taken by the authorities for preventing trouble. Policemen accompanied by a small body of soldiers stopped trains outside of Indianapolis and disarmed the passengers. Others were arrested in Indianapolis and taken to the police court charged with carrying concealed weapons. "In all, about 500 loaded revolvers were taken from those who attended the meeting."²

When General John Morgan crossed into Indiana on his famous raid he had every reason to believe that he would receive substantial aid from the Indiana "lodges" which were very numerous in southern Indiana, but hardly a man joined his ranks and the raid was converted into a race for the fords of the Ohio.³ Most people inferred from this that while the "Knights" might covet big titles and wear swords and pistols they would not fight; but their excuse was that while there was hope of carrying the elections it was better to work in secret.

These societies were scattered through other states, Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, but were not numerous enough to excite so much apprehension as in Indiana and Illinois.⁴

After the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, Governor

¹ Foulke, *Life of Morton*, I, 243.

² *Ibid.*, 273-77.

³ *Ibid.*, 284, 386; Rhodes, *History of the United States*, V, 313-17.

⁴ Milwaukee, though, was reported as "disloyal beyond a doubt," and it was said "that it would be foolhardiness to attempt a draft without protection," and a similar report came from St. Paul. *Id.*, IV, 534, 543-74.

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Morton, addressing an audience at Cincinnati, said: "The great event of the war, and one which is of special importance to the city of Cincinnati, has transpired--the opening of the Mississippi river. It is the beginning of the end * * *."¹

But the end was not yet. Chickamauga and the siege of Chattanooga followed in September and the Union forces were unsuccessful in most of their operations in January, February, March, and April, 1864. The Red River expedition under General Banks was especially disastrous, and again the cry was raised, "You never can defeat the South." There was a feeling, both in the North and in the South, that the troops of the Northwest were about the only ones that had accomplished anything, and this stimulated in the South, a fresh discussion of the feasibility of sending commissioners to the states of the Northwest to negotiate for peace and an alliance with them.

But the Richmond *Enquirer*, which had entertained the idea in 1862, now opposed it. On March 30, 1864 it advocated the election of "Our Best Friend--Abe Lincoln," because it would "Effectually and forever close the door against all kinds of reconstruction; cutting off the Northwestern States just as effectually as the Northeastern. This is a most desirable object." On April 1, 1864, under the caption "That North-west Again!" the editor said:

The Selma "Mississippian" continues terribly exercised about the rejection of some alleged proposition, said to have been made by "leading anti-Lincoln men of the Northwest" some eighteen months ago * * *. We may be allowed to say that no such proposition, formal or informal, was ever made to the Government of the Confederate States. * * * If the "political revolution in the "North-west," which the "Mississippian" alleges that the "Enquirer" "arrested," had for its object the reconstruction of the old Union, *under any form whatever*, * * * we rejoice that our efforts have been crowned with success.

¹ Foulke, *Life of Morton*, I, 285.

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By whom was the "Mississippian" driven from its home? What States furnished the troops that ravished, desolated and destroyed Mississippi? What soldiers burnt Jackson * * * and inflicted all manner of injury and insult upon all classes? *The Northwest.* * * * rather than reconstruct under any shape or form, with any part or parcel of our despised and despicable enemies, Virginia will continue the fight. She will know them only as *foreigners*.

The Confederate government evidently thought differently, for Capt. Thomas H. Hines of the Ninth Kentucky Cavalry, who had been with Morgan in his raid through Indiana and Ohio, was sent to Canada in March, 1864 to confer with Jacob Thompson, ex-secretary of the interior in Buchanan's cabinet, who was then acting as "Special Commissioner of the Confederate States in Canada." Thompson was liberally supplied with funds and was to assist Hines in carrying out any plans he might devise to release Confederate prisoners confined on Johnson's Island, Ohio, and in camps near Columbus, Indianapolis, Chicago, Springfield, Illinois, and Rock Island. With the aid of the "Sons of Liberty" these released prisoners were to overthrow the governments of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, and establish a northwestern confederacy. Hines was sent to Windsor, opposite Detroit, to confer with Vallandigham, who had been elected Supreme Grand Commander of the Order. Vallandigham claimed that the Order had enrolled 84,000 men in Illinois, 50,000 in Indiana, 40,000 in Ohio, and lesser forces in other states, amounting altogether to 300,000 men, and that they were thoroughly organized with "major generals" for each state, "brigadier generals" for each county, etc. When properly armed and equipped they would be ready to act with any force that might be sent to aid and direct them. Arrangements were made with Thompson for purchasing and shipping arms and ammu-

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nition to the various organizations, and representatives of the Order were supplied with funds by Thompson.

Captain Hines says that subsequent investigations fully confirmed all that Vallandigham had claimed with reference to the numbers and purpose of this secret organization but, as events proved, they lacked the "unflinching nerve" necessary for success. July 20 was the date first fixed for the uprising and release of prisoners in Illinois and Indiana. At the suggestion of numbers of the Order, however, the date was changed to August 22, to enable Confederate forces to move into Kentucky and Missouri and thus occupy the attention of the Federal troops stationed in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, and this date was again changed to August 29, on which day the Democratic national convention would meet at Chicago. It was thought that the "Knights," or "Sons," could concentrate in Chicago on that date without attracting attention, and that the prisoners at Camp Douglas, over 5,000 in number, could easily be released and armed and that they then, with the aid of the "Knights," or "Sons," could easily set at liberty the 7,000 prisoners confined at Springfield and overpower any forces of the United States in Illinois. The success of this uprising would embolden the Indiana men, and the movement would spread until the whole Northwest would become involved. If Union troops were withdrawn from the front to put down the insurrection, the Confederate armies in the field would press forward and, crossing the Ohio, aid in the establishment of the new northwestern confederacy. On the appointed day Captain Hines, with some sixty Confederate officers of experience and ability, was in Chicago ready for action, but the "Knights" were too few in number and too poor in spirit to justify action. There were evidences that some of the men were being closely

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watched by government detectives and the best thing to do was to break up and get out of Chicago as speedily and quietly as possible. Thus failed the most promising enterprise for establishing a northwestern confederacy by armed insurrection.¹

After the fall of Atlanta General Beauregard was again placed in command of the Western Department of the Confederacy, although Hood retained field command of the army. Both knew that President Davis was opposed to another invasion of Tennessee and Kentucky and that he thought the army ought to oppose, follow, or cut across and get ahead of Sherman's army.² Yet, obsessed with the old idea that thousands of recruits in Tennessee and Kentucky were only waiting for an opportunity to join the Confederate army, and that a movement north would result in the long-talked-of rising in the Northwest, Beauregard authorized Hood's ill-starred movement into Tennessee. His army was repulsed at Franklin with heavy losses in killed and wounded and still heavier loss in *morale*, and was completely shattered at Nashville.

¹ The source for most of this information is Benn Pitman's stenographic notes of the treason trials at Indianapolis in the fall of 1864, published at Cincinnati in a volume of 340 pages, double column, very fine print. Those who do not care to go through this mass of question and answer, will find most of the facts stated in a report of Judge Advocate General Holt to the secretary of war, dated Oct. 8, 1864. Foulke, *Life of Morton*, I, 385-432, gives a good summary of the trials. Senator Morton himself gave an excellent account of the movement in a speech in the United States Senate, May 4, 1876. Other very readable accounts may be found in Rhodes, *History of the United States*, V, 320-38; Nicolay and Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, VIII, 1-27; Randall and Ryan, *History of Ohio*, IV, 262-78. To round out the detailed account persons interested should also read Jacob Thompson's reports to the Confederate secretary of war, Felix G. Stidger, *Treason History of the Sons of Liberty, formerly Circle of Honor, succeeded by Knights of the Golden Circle, afterward Order of American Knights* * * * (Chicago, 1903), and Capt. Hines' very interesting account of the northwestern confederacy published in the *Southern Bivouac* (Louisville, Ky.), II, nos. 7, 8, 9, and 11. It was as thrilling an episode as ever came to naught.

² Davis, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, II, 566-70; John B. Hood, *Advance and Retreat* * * * (Philadelphia, 1880), 278 *et seq.*

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The dream of a northwestern confederacy was effectually dispelled and soon the southern Confederacy ceased to be.

Many things contributed during the war to strengthen the Union feeling in the Northwest. While the South was being depleted of its manhood the Northwest was filling up with a fresh, virile, enterprising, and industrious class of immigrants from the eastern states, from Canada, and from Great Britain, Germany, Sweden, and Norway. They loved freedom, were inured to labor, and had an instinctive aversion to slavery and all its concomitants. Markets were found in the East for all the West could produce, and the southern markets were hardly missed after the first year of the war. When actually deprived of the Mississippi navigation and commerce, the people of the Northwest found they were not so badly off as they had anticipated. Of the products of the South, cotton was the only one the want of which was seriously felt. It was found that tobacco could be raised in the northern states and fine crops of good quality were raised in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and southern Ohio before the war closed. Farmers in Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin experimented with it in 1864 and 1865, and were soon able to supply the market with a good article.

One of the results of the war was that the South learned to raise its own foodstuffs and the North learned to raise its own luxuries. Whisky and tobacco were esteemed such, fifty years ago. Existing railroad lines were extended to and through the West, new lines were built, and old ones consolidated, and railroad transportation to the seaboard was cheapened and expedited until river and lake transportation were hardly thought of as essential or even important. Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois were fairly grid-ironed with railroads, and the iron tracks—soon to be converted into steel—stretched out in every direction

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from Chicago, binding the great Northwest together with bonds more stable than water and providing all the facilities for travel and commerce which the inhabitants could reasonably desire. After the close of the war the river trade between the chief cities of the Ohio Valley and the upper Mississippi and the Gulf states was revived and large fleets of steamers plied the running waters for a time; but gradually this traffic declined. Old steamboats were allowed to sink, burn up, or rot on the sand bars and along the shores, and their places were not supplied. The steamboat landings at Cincinnati and St. Louis, which formerly were wont to be lined with palatial steamers, were almost deserted in the seventies and the Mississippi River ceased to be of commercial importance, except for the transportation of coal. If all these things had been foreseen in 1861, the Northwest might not have deemed the Union worth preserving and might not have put forth that tremendous and heroic effort, without which secession would doubtless have become an accomplished fact. Is it difficult to believe that all these events were guided and controlled by an unseen Power with a view to the beneficent results which all now appreciate and enjoy?

The passions which preceded and immediately followed the Civil War have died out. The soldiers who fought the battles for and against disunion acquired new respect for each other. The breaking up of the United States into a number of provincial confederacies, tormented by sectional jealousy and disturbed by perpetual intrigues and threats of war, is no longer a possibility. State pride, still great, has made room for national pride, and all is well with the Republic.

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